INTRODUCTION
As a rising economic power, China's economy and its links with other countries has received much attention of late. Of particular interest is the growing social, economic and political relationship between China and Africa. This paper specifically examines the determinants of Chinese Foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa between 2003 and 2008 . The period is chosen mainly due to severe data limitations, since this is the only period for which detailed, disaggregated data on Chinese outward FDI (OFDI) could be obtained.
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an important source of outward FDI (OFDI). It seems that China chooses to invest especially in other developing regions, of which Africa is but one. The recent data indicates that Asia was the primary recipient of China's OFDI between 2003 and 2008, accounting for 63.7% of China's total OFDI. Latin America has been the second largest recipient, with 21.8% of total Chinese OFDI. Africa came in third, accounting for only 6.9% of China's total OFDI (MOFCOM, 2008) . Europe, Oceania and North America were in fourth, fifth and sixth position respectively, accounting for 3.1, 2.7 and 1.9%. Though China's preference for investing in other developing regions is clear, questions abound about the nature of Chinese investment in Africa in particular (Verachia, Gordon Institute of Business Science conference, 2010).
China's FDI flows to Africa are only one aspect of a growing social, economic and political cooperation between China and Africa. This relationship is embodied in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and China's White Paper on Africa. It also comes as part of an increasingly open Chinese economy, which has become a much more proactive player in the international arena since the early 2000s 1 . In order to ascertain the drivers of China's FDI flows to Africa, the rest of this paper is structured as follows. Subsequently, the study provides an overview of literature regarding the relationship between FDI and economic growth, as well as the determinants of FDI to Africa. Next, it discusses Chinese FDI flows to Africa between 2003 and 2008, thereafter, it presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of Chinese FDI flows to Africa. Finally, the paper concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Foreign direct investment is a widely researched topic. Within the economic literature on FDI, studies focus either mainly on the relationship between FDI and economic growth, or on the determinants of FDI. This section provides a brief overview of studies on FDI in developing countries published between 2000 and 2010. Since the literature on FDI and economic growth is very wide, this period is chosen in order to present a summary of more recent findings on the subject. Though the topic of Chinese FDI's influence on African growth will not be addressed empirically in this study, the growth literature is reviewed here in order to provide a broad and thorough background to the investigation of Chinese FDI in Africa.
In terms of the literature on the relationship between FDI and economic growth in developing countries, there is some disagreement between researchers on this relationship in developing countries (Table 1) . Some studies found evidence of a uni-directional relationship, others evidence of a bi-directional relationship and a few no evidence that FDI enhances growth in developing countries. The results are dependent on the sample used, the period covered and methods applied. Generally, the majority of research indicates that FDI does enhance economic growth in developing countries. This seems to be especially true for countries that have the necessary absorptive capacities, such as welldeveloped financial markets, sufficient levels of human capital and open trade regimes.
When looking at the impact of FDI in Africa specifically, the literature on Africa differs substantially from those on developing countries in terms of the methods applied, sample of countries included, period covered and variables used. Data restrictions especially make the analysis of FDI in Africaproblematic. Analysis of the literature reveals that limited substantive evidence exists of a specific relationship between FDI and economic growth in Africa. In general, the literature seems to suggest that Africa could benefit from FDI, especially if efforts are made to increase the continent's current level of human capital. This is confirmed by Asiedu (2004) , who argues that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will reap more benefits from FDI in terms of employment generation if human capital and infrastructure are upgraded. The author also argues that Africa should diversify its investment opportunities so that more FDI is aimed at non-primary industries. The relevant research on FDI in Africa, covering the period between 2000 and 2009, is summarised in Table 2 .
The other aspect regarding research on FDI to Africa concerns the determinants of FDI to Africa. In summary, the available but fairly limited literature indicates that the important determinants of FDI to Africa are economic growth, openness to trade, inflation, foreign reserves, quality institutions, good governance, literacy levels, levels of domestic investment and natural resource endowment. It must be remembered that the sample, period covered and methods used in the relevant studies again differ substantially, and these factors influence the outcomes. Results from four relevant studies covering the period 2000 to 2010 are summarised in Table 3 .
CHINESE FDI FLOWS TO AFRICA
This part of the paper presents an overview of the African countries that received FDI from China between 2003 and 2008. General Chinese FDI flows to Africa, as well as flows to specific African country groups are analysed. The African country groupings are based on economic growth performance, level of diversification and regional concentration.
Chinese FDI flows to Africa, 2003 to 2008
China's OFDI to Africa has increased exponentially in recent years. In 2003, China's total OFDI to Africa stood at US$74.8 million. This was the year in which China officially embarked on its so-called "open-door" policy (Buckley et al., 2007 , 1970-1997 FDI was found to positively influence economic growth in five of the eleven countries studied Calvo et al. (2002 ) Panel data analysis, 1970 -1999 FDI enhances growth in the group of selected host countries. An important caveat to this finding is that host countries must display a given, pre-existing level of human capital, economic stability and free markets if they are to fully benefit from FDI. Ram and Zhang (2002) Cross country study, 1990-1997 FDI generally does accelerate economic growth in the host country Kumar and Pradhan (2002) Panel data estimations, 1980-1999 There is a positive relationship between FDI and economic growth. When conducting causality tests, however, the authors found that this relationship is not very strong. Qi (2007 ) Error-correction model, 1970 -1971 2002 Where the relationship between growth and FDI tends to be uni-directional in developed countries, the relationship tends to be bi-directional in developing countries. 
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Asiedu (2002) Panel study , 1988-1997 The determinants of FDI to SSA differ from the determinants to other developing countries. Onyeiwu and Shretsha (2004 ) Panel study, 1975 -1999 FDI to Africa is largely determined by growth, openness, foreign reserves and resource endowments. Asiedu (2006) Panel study, 1984-2000 Macroeconomic stability and sound institutions increase FDI flows to Africa. Naudé and Krugell (2007) Generalised Method of Moments, 1970 Moments, -1990 Inflation, good governance, investment, government consumption and original literacy are important for FDI inflows. Examining Chinese FDI to various African regions, it can be seen that China is steering away from the mainstream investment destinations and focusing more on non-traditional investment destinations. This is because, since 2000, North Africa was the region that attracted the largest volume of flows (Loots, 2009 ). In contrast with this general trend, Chinese FDI is mainly aimed at Southern Africa.
In terms of economic diversification, the McKinsey Institute (Roxburgh et al., 2010) identified thirty one African countries that can be seen as the powerhouses driving Africa's growth during the past decade. Collectively, these countries were responsible for ninety seven percent of Africa's GDP growth between 2000 and 2008. The countries all had GDPs larger than US$ 10 billion in 2008, or had experienced real GDP growth of more than seven per cent between 2000 and 2008. These countries were classified as either diversified, oil exporting, pre-transition or transition economies, according to their exports per capita and economic diversification 3 . Since there is some preliminary reason to believe that China is investing in Africa for reasons of market expansion, it is interesting to note that the grouping that received the majority of average Chinese FDI inflows is the group of diversified economies, which accounted for 65.4% of China's total OFDI to the continent. This indicates that Chinese investors do take economic diversification into account when deciding on investment destinations. This observation, however, does come with a caveat. Though China invests in diversified countries, it does not necessarily mean that Chinese investment is diversified. Many of the countries classified as diversified do not lack natural resources. South Africa in particular stands out in this regard.
The fact that oil exporting countries are the second most prominent group in terms of average Chinese FDI inflows is not surprising, although taken as a percentage of China's total OFDI to Africa (16.2%), it is not as significant as one might have suspected. Pre-transition and transition economies accounted for 2.7 and 6.6% of China's total OFDI to Africa, respectively. The last group of recipient countries which do not fall into any of the previous categories received the least amount of Chinese FDI during the period under investigation.
This indicates that the bulk of Chinese FDI to Africa has been concentrated in the classification provided by Roxburgh et al. (2010) to be the major drivers of African economic growth and lends preliminary credit to the idea that China is investing in Africa in order to obtain greater market access.
In order to gain a clearer picture of China's interest in securing market access, annual GDP growth rates of the various recipient countries were used to classify host countries into three groups, according to average economic growth obtained between 1995 and 2005. This period was chosen on the assumption that countries that achieved good historic economic growth rates would attract larger volumes of FDI inflows. High growth economies include economies that grew at a rate of more than five per cent on average between 1995 and 2005. Medium growth economies obtained average economic growth rates of between three and five per cent, while low growth economies 4 obtained growth rates of less than three percent.
The bulk of Chinese OFDI between 2003 and 2008 went to countries that historically were medium growth achievers, such as Tunisia, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, Kenya and Mauritius, which also represents the larger economies on the continent. This once again seems to confirm the idea posited by Verachia (Gordon Institute of Business Science conference, 2010) that China is interested in investing in Africa in order to gain access to larger markets for its products, since around 97 per cent of all Chinese FDI flows went to countries that could sustainably grow at more than 3 per cent on average per annum.
The data presented in Table 4 presents an image of Chinese FDI in Africa that differs from traditional investors in the sense that Chinese FDI flows to the continent are more widespread than that of traditional investors, since traditional investors tend to focus on a handful of African economies (Loots, 2009) , while China clearly invested in the majority of African countries. Chinese investment in Africa was also distributed across different regions than those more traditionally targeted. The clear interest in oil exporting countries, coupled with diversified and stable growth achievers, however, follow a more traditional pattern of FDI.
Since data regarding the exact sectoral composition of Chinese FDI in Africa are fragmented and anecdotal, it is difficult to verify precisely the nature of Chinese investment in Africa. It is, however, possible to examine the African countries that receive Chinese FDI and make some preliminary conclusions based on this. An overview of deals concluded between Chinese and African firms between 2006 and 2010 confirms China's involvement in construction, mining and oil in particular (Claassen, North West University, Master's thesis, 2011).
China's strategy in securing African resources involves loans needed for infrastructure. These concessionary loans mostly do not carry any interest repayments, and where interest repayments are applicable the interest rate is very low. Loans are often repaid with resources, illustrating the unconventional way in which China does business (Sautman and Yan, 2009 ). This unconventional way of conducting business is a trademark of China's investment approach, and extends to China's relationship with Latin America as well (Naidu et al., 2009 ).These observations lead to the hypothesis that mining, oil and infrastructure could be important determinants of Chinese FDI to Africa.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that Chinese firms are investing in African agriculture. Hallam (2009: 2) argues that this is part of an increasing trend in which investors seek out opportunities in food production in developing countries, motivated by mounting concerns about food security and increasing food prices. Hallam (2009: 2) cites China, various Gulf states, and Korea as important global investors in food production, which includes agriculture. The main recipients of agricultural FDI in Africa are currently Sudan, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Other African countries receiving Chinese FDI which aimed at food security include Mozambique, Namibia and Gabon, where Chinese firms have entered into joint ventures in the fish industry. In Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Chinese firms are hiring farming land (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008) . From this, it is deduced that agricultural land might also be an important determinant of Chinese FDI.
MODELING CHINESE FDI TO AFRICA
The two main sources of data for the empirical analysis are the World Bank and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The World Bank provides data on various indicators in its African Development Indicators and World Governance Indicators Databases, while MOFCOM provides disaggregated statistics on China's OFDI to the rest of the world in its publication, the Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
The most recent Statistical Bulletin that could be obtained from MOFCOM is the 2008 version. This includes disaggregated data on China's OFDI between 2003 and 2008. Since data is only available for such a short period, the use of panel analysis is necessary. One also needs to take into account that comparable data for all African countries is limited as well, further restricting the use of more sophisticated proxies.
Using these variables as a basis from which to work, various models were run in order to find the best possible fit. The selected model was then used as a base model which generally explains the determinants of Chinese FDI to Africa. After numerous iterations, the base model that provided the best fit is 5 : CFDI = f invest, polsta −1 , inflate −1 , ger −1 , rsa, openness, infra
Where: CFDI 6 represents Chinese FDI to Africa; Invest is the domestic investment of the host country, measured as the host country's gross domestic investment; Polsta represents political stability and is an index compiled by the World Bank in its World Governance Indicators; Inflate is the host country's annual CPI inflation rate, which serves as a proxy for macroeconomic stability; GER is the gross secondary enrolment rate, a proxy for human capital which is used to substitute the more widely used literacy rate, for which the data for all African countries were not available; RSA is a dummy variable for South Africa, which is a major outlier, especially in the year 2007/2008, during which the ICBC obtained a twenty percent stake in Standard Bank; Openness stands for trade openness; and Infra represents the host country's infrastructure.
Political stability, inflation and gross secondary enrolment are lagged, as it is likely that the value of each of these variables in the current period will influence the value in the next period. For example, if a country is currently enjoying political stability and good governance, it will likely only influence FDI inflows to that country in the following period 7 . The restrictions of the estimated model must be kept in mind -because data is available for such a short period of time only, inevitably the estimated model will pose some limitations. However, the results obtained from such a panel analysis can serve as a broad platform on which to base further research and analyses regarding Chinese investment in Africa.
Once the abovementioned base model has been established, the following additional variables are added in order to test various hypotheses about China's investment in Africa:
The literature on Chinese investment in Africa suggests that food security could be an important consideration in China's African investment strategy. To test this hypothesis, the percentage of agricultural land currently in use in a host economy is used. Similarly, energy security seems to be an important preliminary motivation for Chinese investment in Africa. To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable for oil exporting countries is added to the model. An important potential explanation for increased 5 The author is aware of the fact that, though these variables generally explain FDI inflows to host countries, China may very well follow a different pattern than traditional investors. However, a study of China's growth path vs. that of the West falls outside the scope of this study. 6 Refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of variables and data sources. 7 The time lag is fairly short due to data restrictions. Chinese FDI in Africa that is often overshadowed by the resource-seeking debate, is the possibility that Chinese firms are interested in investing in Africa as a means to expand market access and gain experience in establishing and managing brands. This is a hypothesis that seems feasible in light of the literature reviewed, and therefore it is expected that countries that represent a larger market will receive more Chinese FDI. 
Other effects that are tested for include dummies for landlocked countries, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), ex-socialist regimes and an index for export diversification, but none of these variables proved to be significant. Correlation matrices and Granger causality tests are used to rule out possible multicollinearity and endogeneity, where possible. The results of these tests are discussed in more detail later on in this paper. Note that three countries in the sample are outliers. Firstly, South Africa is by far the largest recipient of Chinese FDI in Africa and has received significantly greater volumes of Chinese foreign investment than other African countries.
The years 2007 and 2008 in particular saw a drastic increase of inflows to South Africa, with the conclusion of the ICBC's acquisition of a twenty per cent stake in Standard Bank Limited. In 2007, Zambia received an US$800 million investment deal from China that also causes variation in the sample (People's Daily online news article, 2008). Also in 2007, Nigeria received payment from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) for its acquisition of a forty five per cent stake in an offshore oil field (UNCTAD, 2009:78) . A single dummy is assigned to South Africa, since South Africa is by far the largest outlier, where Zambia and Nigeria are marginal outliers. The subsequently, the study will summarise and discuss the results that were obtained from the panel analysis. Table 5 presents results for the base model and two other models that were estimated. In the column entitled base model, some fundamental determinants of FDI were estimated according to Equation 1. This model is, admittedly, a very broad specification, but the idea is that, with limited data, the base model should serve as a platform from which to develop more refined models.
Base model estimation, results and discussion
The column entitled agriculture model is a model that was estimated in order to capture China's interest in food security when investing in Africa. The final column, entitled oil model, presents a model in which a dummy for oil exporting countries is added to the base model in order to test for China's interest in oil.
In the base model, the results show that domestic investment, political stability and infrastructure were significant at the five per cent level. When domestic investment in the host economy increased, Chinese FDI increased, suggesting that domestic investment crowded in Chinese FDI. There was also a positive relationship between political stability in the host country and larger Chinese FDI inflows. Given the literature on China, this finding was surprising since popular wisdom suggests that Chinese investors do not consider political issues at all. There was a negative relationship between Chinese FDI and infrastructure in the host economy, in line with model expectations. Traditionally, it would be expected that the converse must be true. However, given the Chinese proclivity for investing in infrastructure in Africa, this result seems to suggest that Chinese investors targeted countries where low infrastructure was prevalent, since this provided an opportunity for Chinese businesses to provide infrastructure where the demand was high. The South African dummy was highly significant, showing that South Africa, ceteris paribus, received more investment than other African countries did, and also providing preliminary evidence of the market seeking motive in Chinese FDI.
The fact that inflation, gross enrolment and trade openness were not significant at any level indicated that China did not consider macroeconomic stability or human capital when investing in Africa. This outcome corresponded with expectations formed from the literature on China. The insignificance of the gross enrolment rate also confirmed the notion that Chinese FDI had more of a resource-seeking than efficiency-seeking motive.
Furthermore, trade openness was also not a significant variable. The R-squared value of the base model indicated a good fit, with 89.95% of the variation in Chinese FDI being explained by the relevant variables included in the base model.
To test for China's interest in food security, agricultural land was added to the base model in order to obtain the agriculture model. The significance and signs of the other coefficients remained largely the same as in the base model. The agricultural variable was significant and the coefficient negative, as expected. This means that China invested less in countries that were already close to utilising their full agricultural land. Chinese investors rather invested in countries with underutilised agricultural land for purposes of food security. The goodness of fit of the agriculture model, as indicated by the R-squared value, was 90.56%.
In the oil model, a dummy was added for oil exporting countries to indicate whether China invested more in oil exporting countries than in non-oil exporting countries. This is a significant question, given the fact that current opinion on the subject suggests that oil and natural resource abundance is a very important determinant of Chinese FDI in Africa. The oil dummy was significant when added to the base model and the relationship was positive, confirming the hypothesis that China has a significant interest in African oil. However, the signs of the coefficients of domestic investment, political stability and gross secondary enrolment changed. This most likely occurred due to some level of multicollinearity between the oil dummy and these variables. Since the variable used to measure oil is a dummy variable, it was not possible to draw up a correlation matrix in order to analyse this problem. The oil model had the highest goodness of fit of the three models estimated, accounting for 96.51% of the variation in Chinese FDI.
Extended base model estimation, results and discussion
A general concern of the base and other two models presented here was that they did not control for market size. Traditionally, this is an important determinant of FDI and controlling for market size would address an important question, namely if China's interest in Africa is for market expansion purposes. To capture the effect of market size on Chinese FDI, a dummy variable was added. This variable identified the ten recipient countries of Chinese FDI that have the highest GDP. The model was then estimated according to Equation 2 (Table 6) .
Adding the large economy dummy to the model as a proxy for market size had a significant impact on the results. Since inflation, gross secondary enrolment and trade openness were not significant in any of the iterations run, these variables were omitted and the large economy dummy was added to obtain the extended base model. This model still had a very respectable goodness of fit, with an R-squared of 0.96.
The results showed that domestic investment, political stability and the dummies for the large economies and South Africa were significant. Infrastructure became insignificant, whereas in the previous base model estimated, it was significant. Though the two results were contradictory, they seemed to represent two possibilities.
Firstly, it could be that China invested in infrastructure in countries where the level of infrastructure was low because it provided the best opportunities for Chinese construction companies. This is consistent with the preliminary analysis of China's FDI to Africa, which showed that Chinese construction firms have taken an active interest in African infrastructure in recent years.
The second theory is that infrastructure was insignificant to Chinese firms, because they established their own infrastructure. This latter result, obtained from controlling for market size, seemed to suggest that Chinese firms are willing to invest in infrastructure if a particular market was attractive or large enough. It is also interesting to note that, once market size was controlled for, the signs on the coefficients of political stability and domestic investment changed. When controlling for market size, there was a negative but significant relationship between domestic investment, political stability and Chinese FDI, whereas in the base model, these variables showed positive signs throughout and only changed signs when the oil dummy was added.
A possible explanation for this change in coefficients is that there existed a degree of multicollinearity between domestic investment, political stability and market size. Though it was not possible to test for this by using a correlation matrix, since market size is a dummy variable, examination of the data showed that the countries with large markets (based on GDP), are also generally countries that rank poorly on the political stability index that was used in the model 8 . This in itself presented an interesting discussion point regarding Chinese FDI in Africa. It seems that China actually followed a very traditional investment pattern when market size was not controlled for. In other words China invested more in countries that were more politically stable when market size was not taken into consideration. However, as soon as market size was controlled for, this changed. This would seem to indicate that China is indeed set on expanding its market access, and if a country provides an attractive enough market, China will invest in it regardless of political stability. This idea is confirmed by Buckley et Claassen et al. 11593 al. (2007) , who conclude that political risk encourages rather than discourages Chinese FDI. Similarly, with regard to domestic investment, many of the top ten largest economies were also economies with lower levels of domestic investment, or countries for which data on domestic investment was not complete. It seems, once again, that market size changed China's investment pattern in this regard.
To obtain the extended agriculture model, the agricultural land variable was added to the extended base model. Available agricultural land was still significant. The sign was also as expected, showing that China invested less in countries that were already close to their maximum agricultural land utilisation. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients and significance of the other variables remained as they were in the extended base model. The extended agricultural model had a good goodness of fit, accounting for 96.6 per cent of the variation in Chinese FDI. An extended oil model was not estimated, since the majority of the top ten largest economies in Africa are also oil-exporting countries and this caused estimation problems.
These results pose some interesting questions about China's motivations for investing in Africa. Controlling for market size seemed to suggest that China was looking to expand its markets. The top ten largest economies generally received much more Chinese investment than smaller economies did. However, food security and oil were still significant factors.
The results lead to the conclusion that China's investment strategy was broader and more complex than initially anticipated. What was clear was the fact that domestic investment, political stability, agricultural potential, oil exports and market size were significant factors in attracting Chinese FDI. Human capital, macroeconomic stability and trade openness were not significant determinants of Chinese FDI.
The relationship between Chinese FDI and the host country's infrastructure was inconclusive, with the base model showing the relationship between Chinese FDI and infrastructure to be negative and significant, and the extended base model showing that infrastructure was insignificant. Chinese investors seemed to either invest in countries where there was a shortage of infrastructure, or not to consider infrastructure at all, since they established their own infrastructure in the countries in which they invested.
Causality tests
Here, information on causality tests between Chinese FDI and various other variables is provided. These causality tests are not meant to provide any in-depth insights into the dynamics between Chinese FDI and various African performance variables, but instead to clarify some issues which are controversial, and could most likely serve as basis for future research and analysis.
The causality between Chinese FDI and African GDP
Granger causality tests were used in order to establish the relationship between Chinese FDI and these important determining factors. The relationship between Chinese FDI and African GDP was found to be bidirectional. African countries with higher GDPs will most likely attract larger amounts of Chinese FDI, while Chinese FDI will enhance economic growth in African countries. This is consistent with the literature review earlier, which concluded that there is no clear-cut, unidirectional relationship between FDI and host country economic growth.
The causality between Chinese FDI and African corruption
A common perception of the Chinese way of doing business is that corruption is the order of the day. Similarly, Africa is well known for its corrupt regimes. Critics of China in Africa fear that the Chinese presence in Africa will only entrench the corrupt business mentality. It is against this background that the causal relationship between corruption and Chinese FDI is interesting -do Chinese firms invest in Africa because local corruption makes it easy for them to do so, or do African officials become corrupt because the Chinese firms enable them to?
The Granger causality test showed that the null hypothesis that corruption does not Granger-cause Chinese FDI could be rejected at the five per cent significance level. The implication is that African corruption did Granger-cause Chinese FDI, signalling that Chinese investment in Africa took place because corrupt practices here made it easy for Chinese firms to enter African markets. However, the null hypothesis that Chinese FDI does not cause corruption could not be rejected at any level, which implied that corrupt Chinese practices were not necessarily standing in the way of Africa overcoming corruption.
The causality between Chinese FDI and African infrastructure
With China's demonstrated interest in contributing toward African infrastructure, the causal link between infrastructure and Chinese FDI is interesting to examine. Do high levels of African infrastructure make investments attractive to Chinese firms, or does the presence of Chinese firms in African countries enhance local infrastructure? The Granger causality test showed that the latter was true. It was not African infrastructure that attracted Chinese investment, but rather the absence of infrastructure that crowded in Chinese FDI. This was consistent with the findings in the extended base model. The fact that Chinese investment contributed toward African infrastructure is positive. The most appealing trademark of FDI is that it should allow for spillovers to take place. The Granger causality test above showed that Chinese FDI is contributing towards more infrastructure investment in Africa.
The causality between Chinese FDI and African human capital
If Chinese FDI is to be beneficial to Africa, then the local population must be able to share in positive spillovers resulting from FDI. This includes access to technology, management skills and human capital. Ideally, local workers should learn from foreign investors and this should contribute toward African human capital. To test for the causality between Chinese FDI and human capital, a Granger test was conducted on Chinese FDI and gross secondary enrolment, which is the proxy for human capital in the model. The results showed that the relationship between these two variables was bidirectional, with human capital attracting FDI, but FDI also leading to the development of human capital (Table  7) .
CONCLUSION
This article aimed at providing empirical evidence on some of the debates on Chinese investment in Africa. It is an issue that is often difficult to shed light on, given the level of political rhetoric and debates in the popular press surrounding it. However, a literature review and an empirical analysis make it possible to steer the debate toward some clearer ground.
China invests in the majority of African countries. During the period 2003 to 2008, China invested in 45 of the 53 African states. Chinese FDI was aimed at diversified, medium growth economies during the period under investigation. Southern Africa is the region which attracted the largest volume of Chinese OFDI, with South Africa being the country that attracted by far the most Chinese OFDI in Africa.
Disaggregated data on Chinese OFDI to various African industries is not available. However, a survey of various articles in the popular and academic press indicates that China has a specific interest in African construction, mining and oil. Beijing follows a unique "infrastructure for oil" approach under which infrastructure is built in Africa, in exchange for various resources. This shows that resource security is an important consideration for Beijing.
In modeling Chinese FDI in Africa, the results indicate that domestic investment, market size, agricultural potential and oil are important and significant determinants of Chinese FDI. Political stability of the host country is a significant determinant of Chinese FDI, though the exact relationship is unclear. It seems that political stability is, surprisingly, important to China but that this factor becomes less important if the potential market is attractive enough. Quality infrastructure is an inconclusive determinant of Chinese FDI. Chinese firms seem to either target countries where quality infras-tructure is low, or they seem not to consider infrastructure at all.
This study shows that China, as a growing world economic power, needs to expand its markets and establish world-class brands, as well as ensure food security for its large population. The country is evidently a very strategic economic player, with aspirations to become the world's leading nation once again, and its strategy in Africa should be viewed against this background. Africa is a growing market and provides opportunities for Chinese firms to gain more experience in the branding and management of their products. Africa also has agricultural potential which can be exploited in order to improve food security. Moreover, Africa consists of 53 individual states whose political support can be very valuable in multilateral platforms.
The results presented in this study refute the general perception of solely resource-driven Chinese FDI in Africa. China invested in diversified, medium growth economies between 2003 and 2008. This leads to the conclusion that, although resource security is an important consideration for Chinese investors, Beijing's approach to Africa does appear much wider than popularly believed.
